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Abstract 
The thesis undertakes an investigative analysis of the Quilliam Foundation, the world’s first counter 
extremism think tank. A strong opponent of Islamist ideology in its battle against extremism, since 
its formation Quilliam has attracted growing criticism. The thesis traces the reasons behind this crit-
icism in order to answer the question posed - what went wrong for Quilliam? Issues of unsound 
theory, the influencing of government, the support of the Prevent policy and a series of public rela-
tions disasters has caused Quilliam to alienate the very people it needs to work alongside. Its actions 
have caused it to be mistrusted and to be deemed out of touch with what it mean to be Muslim in 
modern Britain.  
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Introduction 
The issue of extremism has never been more relevant than it is today. From the rise of far right neo-
Nazi groups  across mainland Europe  to militant Islamists who have carried out deadly attacks on 1
Western soil, the issue of extremism  is no longer the ‘foreign problem’ it was once thought of as. 
Whilst the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 signalled for many the realities of Islamic ex-
tremism, these were acts carried out by foreign citizens who had been radicalised abroad and as 
such still remained somewhat separate from Western society.  It was then, with disbelief that news 
of the London bombings of July 7th, 2005 emerged as the actions of British citizens who had been 
born and raised in the United Kingdom. It was at this moment that the realisation emerged that ex-
tremism was also a very British problem.  
Since the events of July 7th, a plethora of organisations have appeared; each hoping in some way to 
present a coherent and workable solution to the problem of extremism. One of these organisations is 
the Quilliam Foundation, or Quilliam as it is now known. Founded in 2008 by Ed Husain, Maajid 
Nawaz and Rushed Zaman Ali, the Foundation has been afforded the unique title of being the 
world’s first counter extremism think tank. What made Quilliam stand out was the stories of its 
founding fathers; three former Islamist radicals, reformed and ready to challenge the very ideology 
they used to follow. Thus, they seemed to be the very solution to the extremist problem, uniquely 
placed to impart valuable information in order to counter the extremist threat lying in our midst. 
And so Quilliam was launched with much fanfare and media attention but it wasn’t long before 
grumblings began to emerge from those critical of the organisation.   2
My first introduction to Quilliam was a cursory glance at their website whilst preparing my Masters 
application. It looked, perhaps to my naive eye, to be an organisation which was doing all the right 
things and so I assumed it was one accepted and commended by both academics, politicians and by 
Muslim communities in Britain. Fast forward to November 2015 and my attendance at the Nohoudh 
Muslim Integration Conference: Engaging with the Discourse hosted by the School of Oriental and 
 Felicity Capon, "Neo-Nazi Activity on the Rise in Europe," Newsweek, March 24, 2015, , accessed Sep1 -
tember 30, 2016, http://europe.newsweek.com/neo-nazi-activity-rise-europe-316465 
Henry Williams and Dolan Cummings, "Quilliam Foundation: A Thoughtful Think-tank?," Spiked Online 2
April 28, 2008, , accessed September 29, 2016, http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/5036. 
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African Studies.  It was during this conference that my assumptions were drastically challenged, 3
and initial grumblings of criticism against Quilliam quickly transformed into vocal and strident op-
position.  Further research was to confirm this reality and so sparked the question of this thesis: 4
what went wrong for Quilliam? How did an organisation, which on the face of it showed so much 
promise, which ticked all the right boxes in being able to tackle Islamic extremism, come to be held 
with such a sense of mistrust and unease by not only the different Muslim communities that exist in 
Britain, but also by academics, journalists and politicians. In order to answer this question an inves-
tigative analysis of the Foundation and the criticism levelled at it will be undertaken.  
In Chapter I, the Quilliam Foundation will be analysed in order to establish the Foundation’s mo-
tives and beliefs and in turn reveal its approach to the issue of countering extremism in Britain. 
Chapter II, will go right to the heart of problem in order to answer the question posed with three 
main areas being unveiled as the root causes of Quilliam’s rejection. Finally, before concluding and 
in light of the issues raised by the discussion, the questions of where do we go from here in re-
sponse to the problem of extremism  will be discussed in light of the lessons learned from the Quil-
liam experience.  
Before commencing it first feels necessary to provide some definitions for terms used in this work, 
in order to avoid confusion. As this thesis is centred around the UK experience of counter- extrem-
ism and terrorism policies, it seems most appropriate to adopt the definitions of these terms as en-
shrined in UK law.  In this piece, the term 'extremist' or 'extremism' is used to denote behaviour 5
which goes against British values. Such values are freedoms of expression, belief, tolerance and 
mutual respect. ‘Radical belief’ is  used to denote beliefs which whilst they may be extreme in na-
ture but are essentially non-violent. Radicalisation is used to denote the process or change undertak-
en by an individual in their adoption of extreme ideas or beliefs. In trying to define these terms we 
highlight the problem inherent in any discussion of extremism and counter terrorism policy; who 
 for further clarity on the content of Nohoudh Muslim Integration Conference information can be found at 3
https://www.soas.ac.uk/soas-nohoudh-muslim-integration-conference/. A outline of the conference proceed-
ing and videos of the topics discussed is featured. 
 Rizuaan. Sabir,"The Quilliam Foundation as a Propaganda Resource in the UKCampaign Against Political 4
Islam." Proceedings of SOAS - Nohoudh Muslim Integration, London 5th November 2015. 
 HM Government. "CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Extremism" July 2011. Accessed Sep5 -
tember 28, 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-summa-
ry.pdf. 
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decides what is or is not extreme? If it is secular society then where does religion fit it and in what 
form is it deemed acceptable? These are questions which shall be discussed in the body of the the-
sis. 
CHAPTER 1  
The Quilliam Foundation and Counter Extremism  
In order to truly understand what went wrong for Quilliam, it is necessary to get to the root of what 
Quilliam really believes, what its motives are and how it seeks to achieve these according to their 
self-understanding. In reading about Quilliam it is easy to become swept up in the criticism and 
controversy surrounding the Foundation. A simple google search of the words ‘Quilliam Founda-
tion’ and ‘criticism’ brings up a plethora of blogs and articles critical of the Foundation.  However 6
much of what is written fails to point out exactly what it is that has generated this distain which 
seems to be held across the board. It almost appears as if many who comment on the Foundation do 
so with little knowledge and entrenched opinions. This is not to say that the criticisms levelled at 
Quilliam are not accurate, but rather in order to properly answer the question posed it is necessary 
to first to go back to the beginning.  
The Quilliam Approach  
The Quillian Foundation, or Quilliam as it is now known, was founded in 2008 under the headline 
of the world’s first counter extremism think tank. Its main objective is to challenge all forms of ex-
tremism, however its main focus to date has been in the arena of Islamic extremism. A unique sell-
ing point for the Foundation has been the unusual background of its founding fathers; three former 
Islamist extremists. The three founders, Ed Husain, Maajid Nawaz and Rashad Zaman Ali, are all 
former members of the non-violent Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, a pan-Islamic organisation which 
seeks to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate across the world through non-violent means. It is undeni-
ably this factor which has heavily influenced Quilliam’s approach to counter extremism and what it 
sees as the most effective way of preventing radicalisation. To understand the Quilliam position it is 
 Amad, "Quilliam Foundation: All Muslims Are Dangerous Except Us," MuslimMatters.org, September 2, 6
2010, , accessed September 30, 2016, http://muslimmatters.org/2010/09/02/quilliam-foundation-all-muslims-
are-dangerous-except-us/ ,5Pillars. "Islamophobic Author Sam Harris Is Funding Quilliam Foundation." 
5Pillars.com. October 15, 2014. Accessed September 30, 2016. http://5pillarsuk.com/2014/10/15/islamopho-
bic-author-sam-harris-is-funding-quilliam-foundation/. 
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first important to outline its approach to radicalisation as this directly informs on how the issue of 
countering extremism is addressed.  
The Quilliam model of radicalisation is known as the Transtheoretical Model of Change.  Original7 -
ly developed in 1977 by James Prochaska, to analyse behavioural changes in the area of health 
promotion, the model identifies the key stages through which an individual progresses when they 
change their behaviour. Quilliam’s founders have, however, sought to apply it to the field of radical-
isation studies. On close inspection the Transtheoretical Model of Change differs little from what is 
seen as the currently held understanding of radicalisation in government policy making – that is, the 
conveyor belt theory of radicalisation. Both theories promote a similar belief; radicalisation is a 
process of change through which a person progressively moves. In Quilliam’s interpretation of the 
model an individual moves along an ascending path starting with pre- contemplation, moving to 
contemplation, preparation, action and then maintenance.  The Quilliam model, it  is asserted, is 8
more flexible and avoids the pitfalls of the traditional conveyor belt theory which tends to be overly 
linear. By envisaging radicalisation as a series of ascending stages, the model is able to take into 
account for the fact that an individual may stop at a stage for an indeterminate amount of time, per-
haps indefinitely, or move back or forwards along the path.  However, what is key and critical to 9
both forms of the model, is that one stage cannot be reached without first completing the stage prior 
to it; preparation cannot be achieved without first contemplation and prior to this pre-contempla-
tion. The factor which makes a person move up or down this model is their commitment to the 
cause.  It is therefore necessary to determine what drives this commitment in order to establish 10
what in turn drives the radicalisation process.  
Quilliam points to four contributory factors which make a person more likely to adopt an extremist 
ideology: exposure to the ideology, exposure to a group who can legitimise the ideology, a crisis of 
 Jonathan Russell and Alex Theodosiou, "Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7," July 2015, , accessed 7
September 28, 2016, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-
extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf. 16
 Russell and Theodosiou, "Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 16-178
 Russell and Theodosiou, "Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 16-179
 Russell and Theodosiou, "Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 1710
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identity and the holding of real or perceived grievances.   Of these four factors, Quilliam holds 11
ideology to play the key part and this ideology in Quilliam’s opinion is defined as Islamism. 
Before moving any further forward it is first important to clarify what is meant by Islamism in Quil-
liam’s understanding. The term is by all accounts a fairly new creation, first coming to light in 
French writing in 1883.   Despite this, real recognition of the term was not achieved until after the 12
1979 Iranian Revolution when Ayatollah Khomeini created the Twentieth Century’s first Islamic 
government.  Islamism manifests itself in a multitude of ways, and is a complex and often misused 13
term. For the purposes of our study it seems proper to use Quilliam’s definition of Islamism as this 
appears to be in line with general scholarly consensus on the subject.  Quilliam defines Islamism 14
as: 
‘…the belief that Islam is a political ideology, as well as a faith. It is a modernist claim that 
 political sovereignty belongs to God, that Shari’ah should be used as state law, that Muslims 
 form a political rather than a religious bloc around the world and that it is a religious duty 
 for all Muslims to create a political entity that is governed as such.’15
It is important to note that Islamism, the political ideology, is not the same as Islam, the faith. Fol-
lowing the faith of Islam does not mean that you also follow the tenets of the Islamist ideology. This 
is an important distinction to make, as many Muslim’s find the ideas of Islamism to be quite con-
trary to their religious beliefs. 
Whilst Islamism, the political ideology, is to be distinguished from Islam, , bridges or links do exist 
between it and other forms of Islamic faith positions. Islamism is an ideology which seeks to derive 
legitimacy from a selective interpretation of the Islamic faith. Islamists do not form one cohesive 
bloc and instead can be divided into sub religious affiliations. Mehdi Mozaffari states that Islamism 
 Russell and Theodosiou, "Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 16- 20 11
 Mehdi Mozaffari, "What Is Islamism ? History and Definition of a Concept," Totalitarian Movements and 12
Political Religions 8, no. 1 (2007): 17 , doi:10.1080/14690760601121622 17 - 19
 Mozaffari, "What Is Islamism ? History and Definition of a Concept," 17 - 1913
 Mehdi Mozaffari, "What Is Islamism ? History and Definition of a Concept,"14
Quilliam Frequently Asked Questions  Quilliam . Accessed September 27, 2016. http://www.quilliamfoun15 -
dation.org/. 
Page !  of !8 56
can be divided into three main branches: Sunni, Shia and Wahhabi.  (Whilst Wahhabism is also a 16
Sunni sub-sect, he states that ‘it is so different from other Sunni sub-sects that it may be treated as 
an autonomous entity’ ). In this way each sub-sect seeks to derive legitimacy for its ideology from 17
a selective interpretation of the branch of Islam to which it is affiliated. Whilst differences exist be-
tween each subset, Mozaffari states that these different forms of Islamism have much more in 
common that they do apart; their overall aim remains the same ‘they believe in the totalitarian char-
acter of Islam, and they strive towards the same ultimate goal, a global Umma.’  They believe that 18
Muslims should be united as one global community, irrespective of geography or culture, a global 
‘Umma’.  In essence Islamism is a spectrum, and like any political ideology, it is made up of a vari-
ety of different types of organisation. Quilliam categorises Islamism into four different types, each 
of which approaches the pursuit of its objectives in a different way. The first category is that of the 
political Islamist, or what Quilliam refers to as the ‘Entryist'.  In this form of Islamism, an organi19 -
sation is engaged in the political system, seeking to establish its goals through mainstream political 
means. In Quilliam’s opinion it does so by weakening the system from within by targeting vulnera-
ble institutions such as prisons and schools. Such organisations are non-violent in nature. 
The second category is the ‘Revolutionary Islamist’  where organisations renounce violence but 20
also refuse to engage in the political system. Instead they build support where they may be able to 
overthrow the current regime, such as by way of a military coup. The third category is the ‘Militant 
Islamist’  These groups use violence in order to advance their goals, justifying their acts as neces21 -
sary. Finally there exist members who will move between each of these groups, employing the tac-
tics which best suit their needs.  
Whilst militant Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS (Islamic State) pose an obvious threat 
through their commitment to violence, Quilliam is of the belief that non-violent Islamist organisa-
tions, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and The Muslim Brotherhood, are also dangerous. In essence Quilliam 
 Mozaffari, "What Is Islamism ? History and Definition of a Concept, 2516
 Mozaffari, "What Is Islamism ? History and Definition of a Concept, 2517
 Mozaffari, "What Is Islamism ? History and Definition of a Concept, 27 18
 Russell and Theodosiou,"Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7” 1319
 Russell and Theodosiou,"Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7” 13. 20
 Russell and Theodosiou,"Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 1321
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believes that the ideology that all Islamist organisations follow is the same and so the danger exists 
whether they implore violence or not. For Quilliam Islamist ideology creates the mood music from 
which violent extremist ideologies develop. It gives the moral oxygen to the beliefs of militant 
groups, legitimising their actions. For Quilliam Islamist ideology does this by creating a separatist 
identity in the minds of its followers: 
‘ It preaches that a Muslim’s identity, religion and even individual personality are all incom-
plete unless he or she is living under the Sharia in an Islamic state. Islamism also teaches 
that British Muslims should be loyal to other Muslims, whoever they are and wherever they 
might be, ahead of being loyal to their fellow citizens.’  22
Quilliam points to the example of the July 7th Bombers as an example of how this ideology oper-
ates in practice.  In his video, prior to the bombing, Mohammed Siddique Khan, one of the 7/7 23
bombers, used words which are littered with this separatist ideology demonstrated through his dis-
tinct choice in vocabulary. The British government, its citizens and actions are identified with the 
term ‘your’ whereas he uses the term ‘my’ in reference to his Muslim brothers and sisters, regard-
less of their location in the world.  In this way he identifies himself as being separate from his fel24 -
low British citizens, despite having been born and raised in the country. They are portrayed as the 
enemy and his loyalty instead belongs to his fellow Muslim brothers, a community which tran-
scends national boundaries.   
This separatist mentality is however not something that was unique to the 7/7 bombers nor to indi-
viduals who carry out violent attacks. It is easy to see how minority faiths groups, and not just Mus-
lims in the UK, could hold similar opinions in relation to identity and belonging and yet never con-
template carrying out violent acts. It seems over simplistic to reduce the reasoning for violent ex-
tremist behaviour to this separatist ideology, and it is perhaps here where we begin to see cracks in 
Quilliam’s logic. Quilliam believes that Islamism, in creating this notion of a separate Muslim iden-
tity, is able to exploit the existing identity crisis felt by those who live in places where Islam is a 
 Russell and Theodosiou,"Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 20.22
 Russell and Theodosiou,"Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 2023
 Russell and Theodosiou,"Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 2024
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minority faith.  It presents the British-Muslim identity, which the majority of British Muslims ac25 -
cept so readily, as being mistaken, thus creating for some a sense of crisis.  This crisis is then almost 
simultaneously solved by offering a ‘globalised and politicised Muslim identity’ to replace the 
British-Muslim identity.Quilliam sees Islamism as in essence the desire to live under a theocracy, 
with only those deemed able to interpret the Sharia as able to participate fully.  This goes against 26
the very tenets  of democracy, limits freedom of belief and human rights.  
For Quilliam a key part of the Islamist narrative is that in fostering an identity crisis it is more effec-
tively able to exploit the grievances of individuals.  Grievances, such as foreign policy decisions 27
and the War on Terror, are commonly advocated as reasons for individuals turning to extremist ide-
ologies. This, Quilliam asserts, is a fallacy and suggests that Islamists harness an individual’s exist-
ing grievances and use them to introduce ttheir ideology.’  By introducing the message in a group 28
setting, the message is legitimised and the person is given a sense of purpose, a way of redressing 
perceived wrongs and resolving crises of identity. It is the narrative spun by Islamists which is the 
driving factor in bringing individuals into the extremist fold and is, for Quilliam, the starting point 
of the radicalisation process which has the potential to lead to violent terrorist acts.  
For Quilliam, it would appear as if actual grievances play very little importance in the radicalisation 
process and instead it views them as almost a diversion.. However, it seems naive to dismiss the 
problems and concerns of a diverse group of communities as merely a distraction and in many ways 
only serves to further heighten the frustration that is felt. Social marginalisation, poverty, the war on 
terror, and racism are all issues faced by Muslim communities and for which it is easy to see how 
grievances can be held. In addition, it would seem that the Foundation has failed to see that Is-
lamism in itself is in many ways a product of grievances,  of discontent with the current geopolitical 
landscape.   
Quiliam has released a number of publications which it believes demonstrate this narrative in ac-
tion. Two of these publications shall be discussed: Women and the Caliphate and Radicalisation in 
 Russell and Theodosiou,"Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 20,25
 Russell and Theodosiou,"Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 20,26
 Russell and Theodosiou,"Counter-Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7,” 20 - 2527
 Ghaffar Hussain ‘The real roots of Terrorism’ The Guardian online 17th October 2008 https://www.the28 -
guardian.com/commentisfree/2008/oct/17/islam-religion accessed 9 August 2016
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British Prisons. These two publications demonstrate Quilliam’s belief that the Islamist narrative is 
used to target all sections of society. The first of these publications is an analysis of the official and 
unofficial propaganda of the Islamic State  (IS)in order to demonstrate the pull factors associated 
with an Islamist narrative.  Modern discourse has tended to focus on radicalisation in a gender bi29 -
nary where women have been given an almost passive role in the extremism discourse. However 
recent stories of young British women leaving to travel to Syria and Iraq, such as the Bethnal Green 
Three, has brought to the forefront the fact that extremism is by no means a ‘male’ issue.  Quil30 -
liam demonstrates its understanding of the function of Islamist narrative in documenting how IS 
makes direct appeals to women to join ‘the Caliphate’.  Four main pull factors are identified - em-
powerment, deliverance, participation and piety - again centring around the construction of a narra-
tive which speaks to the grievances and identity crises of the individual.  IS promises empower31 -
ment to those women who decide to join the Caliphate, it does this by presenting the choice to join 
the group as a woman taking control of her life and having the ability to redress perceived wrongs 
she has endured whilst living outside of the Caliphate.  Secondly IS promises deliverance to 32
women who decide to join the group. The Islamist narrative presents the grievances felt by those 
living in western society as being caused by a West in opposition to Islam mentality..  Thirdly IS 33
promises women who join the group the ability to participate. As has been stated, Quilliam believes 
that Islamist ideology exploits the existing identity crisis for those living outside of the Islamic 
Caliphate. By preaching an ideology which states that a Muslim’s identity is only fully developed 
by living under the Sharia, they create the idea that their identity is not complete. In offering ‘sanc-
tuary’ under the Caliphate the group then offers a solution to this crisis and a specific role in which 
to fulfil identity.  Purpose is key to the groups pull factor; it is not just men who have a part to play, 34
women have a purpose within the caliphate, even if it is a strictly non-combatant one. Their role is 
portrayed as a pivotal support role and of utmost importance as being those who will raise the next 
  Haras Rafiq and Nikita Malik, "Caliphettes: Women and the Appeal of Islamic State," November 2015, , 29
accessed September 28, 2016, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/
caliphettes-women-and-the-appeal-of-is.pdf. 
 Ruth Sherlock, Joe Daunt, and Sam Tarling, "Found: The Bethnal Green Schoolgirls Who Ran Away to 30
Syria," The Telegraph, July 3, 2015, , accessed September 28, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
2016/03/18/found-the-bethnal-green-schoolgirls-who-ran-away-to-syria/
 Rafiq and Malik “Caliphettes”  4.31
 Rafiq and Malik “Caliphettes”  18.32
 Rafiq and Malik “Caliphettes” 22.33
 Rafiq and Malik “Caliphettes” 24 34
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generation in the correct beliefs as expounded by IS. This too, Quilliam states, plays on the per-
ceived grievances felt by some living in Western democracies, that is, the ills they face are linked 
specifically to the fact that they are living outside the Islamic state and as such the only answer to 
this problem is to join the group and work to restore the Caliphate . Finally, IS offers the promise of 
piety to women who join the group.  Whilst these factors are not the only ones at play, Quilliam 35
states these are the four key promises used by IS to persuade women to join the Caliphate, particu-
larly in the case of those who travel from Western democracies. The key factor, Quilliam believes, 
is the use of the Islamist narrative, based on the ideology of Islamism , which exploits grievances 
and creates a crisis of identity. The narrative emphasises the idea of separation and the idea that the-
believers’ true potential is not achieved until they are living under the Sharia, within the boundaries 
of an Islamic State. In this way separation is used to exaggerate the grievances and identity crisis, 
and to present the only solution as the adoption and following of an Islamist ideology. Whilst the 
paper raises interesting question relating to women and the pull of the Caliphate, the Quilliam mod-
el of identity appears to be essentialist in nature, taking only religion into account.  Identity is better 
understood as constructed,with a Muslim women’s identity encompassing more than her faith, in-
stead it will be dependent on her environment, experiences and interaction with the world.  By 36
adopting an essentialist notion of identity, Quilliam fails to acknowledge the diverse nature of what 
it means to be a Muslim woman and the reality that a generic uniform reaction to IS propaganda 
cannot be predicted. 
Quilliam’s second practical example is how Islamist narratives operate is in the context of  British 
prisons. This is a topic close to the heart of at least one of the founding members of the organisa-
tion. Maajid Nawaz himself was imprisoned in Egypt for his role in the Islamist organisation Hizb 
ut-Tahrir.   In the research analysis entitled Unlocking Al-Qaeda: Islamist extremism in British 37
prisons, Quilliam researcher James Brandon outlines what he terms the push and pull factors used 
by Islamists to recruit from within British prisons.  The publication demonstrates, in the author’s 38
 Rafiq and Malik “Caliphettes”  30 - 34.35
 For a full discussion on Social theory and religion see James Beckford ‘Social Theory and Religion’ Cambridge Uni36 -
versity Press,(2003)
 Nawaz, Maajid. Radical: My Journey out of Islamist Extremism. London: Random House, 2012. Kindle 37
Edition   
 James Brandon, "Al-Qaeda -Islamist Extremism in British Prisons" Quilliam November 2009, , accessed 38
September 28, 2016, http://quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/unlocking-al-
qaeda.pdf. 
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opinion, the dangers the Islamist narrative  poses to modern British society through its operation in 
the penal system. Brandon points to a number of well known convicted terrorists, from Richard 
Reid the Shoe bomber to Mohammad al-Figari,  a British born convert to Islam, who was convicted 
in 2008 under Terrorism Legislation for participating in terrorist training camps, all of whom Bran-
don argues were introduced to the Islamist ideology whilst in custody.  39
The report identifies what it sees as the pull factors utilised by Islamists to proactively recruit indi-
viduals into their radical ideology. These pull factors are supplemented by what the report terms 
push factors, the initial factors which push an individual away from mainstream society. These are 
preyed upon by Islamists to justify and legitimise their belief system and draw a person into their 
fold.   The analysis has led to the following conclusions on how the Islamist narrative is employed 40
to recruit new people Extremists often target new arrivals to the prison, offering them friendship 
and the social and moral support needed to survive the prison experience. This initial introduction 
forms the beginning of a gradual process of radicalisation in which the individual is introduced 
slowly to the Islamist ideology in the form of advice or spiritual guidance offered by the 
extremist.  At the same time, Quiliam states, extremist figures often adopt positions of leadership 41
in response to alleged wrong doings by the authorities in charge. Quilliam points to figures such as 
Abu Hamza who whilst undergoing a prison sentence organised protests for the serving of Halal 
meals.  Extremists use this leadership role in pursuing just or popular causes felt by Muslim de42 -
tainees to attain authority and legitimacy in the eyes of their fellow inmates. Once their position is 
established they use their influence to bring fellow inmates into the radical ideology.  
Again it can be seen that the Islamist narrative exploits pre-existing grievances and crises of identity 
to present Islamist ideology as the solution. Often inmates who arrive in prison possess a history of 
clashes with authority, and see the State as working against them. Islamists identify these pre-exist-
ing issues and exaggerate them, presenting them with a separatist ideology of the West versus Is-
lam, and offer the Islamist ideology as the solution. In prison, in a highly segregated environment, 
racial and ethnic ties are exaggerated and communities are formed amongst ‘believers’. Radicalisa-
 Brandon “Unlocking Al-Qaeda”at 11- 17 39
 Brandon “Unlocking Al-Qaeda” 5640
 Brandon “Unlocking Al-Qaeda”2741
 Brandon “Unlocking Al-Qaeda”26 - 2942
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tion is seen to accelerate in many cases due to the self imposed seclusion adopted, as there are no 
alternative narratives to be heard and so the Islamist ideology is easily adopted.  
Finally, in some cases, whilst prison affords the first introduction to extremist ideology, it is not un-
til an inmate is released that the radicalisation process fully takes hold. Quilliam reasons that the 
sense of identity created in prison is transferred outside the prison walls by the networks Islamist 
have both in and out of prison. A newly released prisoner is often at a particularly vulnerable point 
in their life. Quilliam’s founders reason that extremists exploit this by promising  support, a preex-
isting community and even a place to live and eat with people from within the Islamist network. 
As such the radicalisation extends beyond the prison cell and into the heart of British Muslim so43 -
ciety. 
Quilliam’s Counter extremism Strategy 
As has been explained, central to Quilliam’s understanding of the process of radicalisation is narra-
tive. In the case of Islamic radicalisation, it is the narrative advanced by Islamism. Quilliam’s cen-
tral thesis is that Islamism should be challenged in all its forms. Non-violent extremist ideologies 
similar to those held by Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir are as dangerous as the violent al-
Qaeda inspired terrorists. They advance a separatist mentality and provide the starting blocks for 
radicalisation towards violence. In addition they give credence to the beliefs that justify violence in 
the name of religion, even when individuals do not actually commit violent acts. Single issue 
movements such as Hamas are seen as equally dangerous by the Foundation, arguing that the group 
have radicalised the Palestinian people by their commitment to a one state solution. Quilliam’s 
opinion on the dangers of ‘non violent extremist ideologies’ would seem to extend to a number of 
other Islamic movements. The Foundation has raised concerns over the Deobandi movement, par-
ticularly in relation to the mosque and seminary environment. Its concerns relate to what it per-
ceived as a highly conservative and isolated tendency among mosque leaders that did not support 
British values.  The Foundation is also critical of the Jamaat-i-Islami movement, believing that as 44
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an Islamist organisation it acts to create the mood music for radicalisation to violence.   It is how45 -
ever more accepting of South Asian Sufism and  recommended to Government that this would be a 
sector that it should seek to work with.   This then begs the question what are the boundaries which 46
separate what the Foundation deem an acceptable and unacceptable organisation or movement? 
What the Foundation appears to be most critical of is the combination of socially conservative val-
ues and what it sees as a separatist mentality which it believes to be threatening to western democ-
racy. In many ways it sees Islamic movements which are engaged in political discourse as danger-
ous and seems to find acceptability in a depoliticised and 'quieter' form of Islam.  
For Quilliam the starting point for any counter extremism strategy should be to challenge the Is-
lamist ideology. The best way to challenge is to advance an alternative counter narrative which re-
veals the fallacies of Islamism . Since its inception in 2008, Quilliam has attempted to strength its 
counter narrative, developing a department focused on the religious element of extremist ideologies. 
It is important to state that Quilliam itself is not a religious organisation. It is however an organisa-
tion which works with issues which have an undeniably religious context. As such, it has sought to 
strengthen its counter narrative by legitimising its alternative through theological discussion.  The 47
Foundation’s Islamic Studies department is headed up by Dr Usama Hasan, a former Imam who has 
contributed a number of publications to the role Islamic theology has to play in the counter extrem-
ism debate.  As part of its counter narrative Quilliam presents what it sees as the theological fallaci-
es of Islamism. The basis of its theological position can be gleamed from the publications available 
on the Foundation’s website.  In these publications Dr Usama Hasan provides references from 48
Qur’anic sources to demonstrate the theological inaccuracies of Islamism . Quilliam’s theological 
Quilliam 'Quilliam welcomes new UK direction on extremism' Quilliam Press February 5 2011. Accessed 45
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ism/
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lam-and-the-freedom-of-belief.pdf.  Usama Hasan ‘The Balance of Islam in Challenging Extremism’ Quil-
liam July 2012 accessed September 29, 2016 https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/
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position is to assert that central to the Islamic faith is the concept of balance.  Both the Quran and 49
Muhammad warned of the dangers of extremist ideology.  Instead a balance must be achieved. 50
Quilliam also asserts that there can be no compulsion in religion, faith under coercion cannot be 
deemed a valid expression of faith.  Dr Hasan points to the famous Islamic Theologian al-Ghazzali 51
(dates?) who 'emphatically asserted that faith and non-faith involve active belief or unbelief rather 
than a passive state or coercion.  It sees Islamists as ignoring this necessity for balance and the ac52 -
tive choice of a believer and. instead using coercive and underhand tactics in the pursuit of their 
goals. From this theological position, Quilliam sees mainstream or moderate Islam as compatible 
with Western democracy and British values and calls on all sectors of the community and  public 
bodies to work together to advance this idea. Islamist ideology entirely contradicts, in Quilliam’s 
worldview, the values of British society as it calls for its followers to live a life apart from their fel-
low citizens. It sees a need for the restoration of balance  in both public and private expressions of 
faith.  53
Central to Quilliam’s counter extremism strategy, is challenging  Islamist ideology. This is to be 
achieved, however, not through the banning of non-violent extremist organisations as this would be 
in opposition to the democratic values of British Society.  The counter narrative should instead be 
advanced as an alternative. However, whilst Quilliam does not call for the organisations to be 
banned, it does believe that Islamist movements should not be given a platform on which to air their 
views. It is highly critical of what it sees as the liberal left defence of Islamists and rebukes them for 
providing a platform for them to express their ideologies. It sees such actions as short sighted and 
dangerous:  
The far-left in their stated objective of standing up for social justice have rationalised work-
ing with, and legitimising, Islamist extremists – those who campaign for the removal of 
rights for “non-believers” under theocratic law. One example includes the far-left’s unity in 
campaigning against far-right fascism – even though the same “humanitarians” advocate a 
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theocratic state that would penalise, or even kill, apostates and homosexuals. The far-left’s 
sheer paranoia of being seen not to side with the ‘oppressed minority’ has pushed them to 
the conclusion of siding with the theocratic Islamists who mimic the Nazi fascists in politi-
cal ideology.  54
This sentiment has also been shown in its approach to Islamist organisations appearing on Universi-
ty Campuses. It has been highly critical of some institutions who have allowed Islamists to speak on 
campus.  The Foundation views University campuses as an incredibly vulnerable area and one in 55
which Islamist organisations do not belong. In addition to this, in the past it has been highly critical 
of entities such as the Islam Channel  for their willingness to give air time to Islamist preachers 56
and for organisations such as The Muslim Council of Britain for having links to Islamist organisa-
tions.  Whilst such organisations are not Islamist in nature, Quilliam sees their  links to or openness 57
to Islamist ideology as dangerous. Quilliam, it would seem is very particular over who should have 
a voice in the counter extremism debate, and it is perhaps here that we see their first rumblings of 
discontent with the Foundation.  
A surface reading of Quilliam’s justifications for focusing counter extremism strategy on both vio-
lent and non violent forms of extremism seems on the basis of the evidence presented to be quite 
persuasive. So then why has the Foundation been so heavily criticised by so many different sections 
of Muslim society?  In the next chapter of the thesis I hope to outline the areas of contention that 
exist between Quilliam and its critics.. Alternative and more compelling theories in the radicalisa-
tion discourse shall be highlighted to demonstrate the unease surrounding Quilliam's understanding 
of what causes radicalisation. In addition it will shown how the counter extremism narrative advo-
cated by Quilliam has cascaded down into UK Counter extremism policy, and has led to discontent 
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and distrust felt toward the Foundation as they are seen as facilitating the securitisation and de-
politicisation of British Muslims. Three incidents are used as case studies to demonstrate the effect 
of further alienating the communities Quilliam seeks to work with. 
CHAPTER II 
The Problems with Quilliam  
Alternative Narratives in the Radicalisation Discourse 
As has been discussed the Quilliam Foundation subscribes to the The Transtheoretical Model of 
Change, a version of the conveyor belt theory of radicalisation. Put simply radicalisation is an as-
cending path upon which an individual travels, starting with pre-contemplation and ending in the 
performance of violent acts and maintenance of the beliefs which inspire these actions. The key to 
this radicalisation process is, for Quilliam, exposure to the Islamist ideology, even in its non violent 
forms. This ideology gives the ‘moral oxygen’ for violent extreme beliefs. Islamist ideology is for 
them, anti-western, anti-democratic and goes against the values of British society. Thus for Quil-
liam, counter extremism must focus on extremism in both its violent and non-violent forms. It is the 
ideology and the narrative spun by those who follow this ideology which is the root cause of ex-
tremism.  
Whilst, as will be shown, the conveyor belt theory of radicalisation has been adopted by Govern-
ment as the official narrative in counter extremism policy, it is by no means agreed upon by the 
wider academic field. The theory chosen to inform policy making has a huge impact on how ex-
tremism is tackled. There is growing consensus among academics that traditional understandings of 
radicalisation do not fully explain why some individuals adopt extremist ideas.  : 58
  
 ‘The role of extremist ideas in the radicalisation process remains a highly contentious issue 
 in the academic field. While some consider non-violent extremist groups as gateways to  
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 violent forms of extremism, others argue that such groups may constitute ‘a legal ‘safety  
 valve’ for extreme views.’  59
Quilliam’s reluctance to accept alternative theories of radicalisation, and its headstrong commitment 
to challenging Islamist ideology, even in its non violent form, has attracted criticism. Some allege 
that such approaches only serve to hinder counter extremism strategies, demonising members of the 
community who might offer workable alternatives. In order to demonstrate the uncertainty which 60
exists within the field of the study of radicalisation and extremism, three recent contributions to the 
field will be discussed. It is hoped that by demonstrating the difference in opinion, the reasons be-
hind the unease felt towards Quilliam can be understood. 
The first contribution  is a recent article by Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, published in 
2015, which summarises the latest empirical literature on the subject of radicalisation.  The article 61
seeks to provide an answer to the question of how and why homegrown radicalisation occurs in 
some western nations. In their analysis of the recent literature on radicalisation, Hafez and Mullins 
have come to the conclusion that the best way to conceptualise radicalisation is as a puzzle, com-
prising of four interlocking parts; grievances, networks, ideology and enabling environments and 
support structures.  The authors reject the traditional linear concept of radicalisation as a process, 62
consisting of steps and stages, instead they assert that the puzzle metaphor better represents the 
concept of radicalisation. They posit that the puzzle analogy better represents the complexity of the 
reality of radicalisation which is a multi-faceted and contextual in nature; there is no one pathway to 
radicalisation. In addition it recognises the puzzling nature of the phenomena which so far has 
western societies failing to find suitable explanations for individuals turning to extremist ideologies:  
  
 ‘Put simply, we have the pieces of the puzzle, but we lack the representative image that  
 informs us how best to put them together….. Each piece of the puzzle can come in a  
 Claire, Arènes "Prevention of Terrorism in Britain: Fighting Violent or Non-violent Extremism? The Influ59 -
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and Pauline Schnapper (London; Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004) 2014, 58-73. doi:
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 different representation just like similarly structured jigsaw puzzles could reveal diverse  
 images once their pieces are interconnected.’   63
Hafez and Mullins point to these four interconnected factors which appear in the majority of the 
biographies of the radicals studied, although the weight each factor has and the way in which they 
interact, varies from person to person. The article concludes that the dominant factor in the majority 
of cases of radicalisation was the network.  Recruitment to radical groups tended to occur through 64
family bonds or pre-existing relationships. The network itself afforded individuals with a purpose, 
attracting those who sought to rebalance power or redress perceived wrongs. In addition the net-
work afforded a sense of collective identity to bring people together who possessed similar opinions 
or were from similar backgrounds. Importantly, it was this collective identity and the creation of 
strong bonds between members of the group which made exit from the group increasingly more dif-
ficult and increased the likelihood of a person remaining within a radical network. Grievance and 
ideology were what the authors described as ‘the landscape that frames the proximate causes of rad-
icalisation’.  Socio-economic factors, increased islamophobia and questionable foreign policy de65 -
cisions by government were all indirect factors to radicalisation. They provided the mood music, 
and were used by radicals to justify their actions but were not predominantly reasons for someone 
adopting extremist views; these were factors which affected millions of Muslims across Europe and 
the West , however only a tiny percentage become radicalised, and as such it cannot be said to be a 
direct cause.  Finally enabling environments and support structures, such as the internet and social 66
media allowed for access to the ideology and publicity material of radical groups. In many cases it 
allowed an introduction to the ‘radical’ world.   
The second contribution comes from a particularly vocal critic of the official narrative on radicalisa-
tion, Professor Arun Kundnani.  Kundnani is visiting professor at of the University of New York 
and has authored a number of pieces on the issues of islamophobia, extremism and the War on Ter-
ror. In his publication A Decade Lost: Rethinking Radicalisation and Extremism (Kundnani 2009)  
Professor Kundnani lays out what he sees as the evidence against the official narrative on radicali-
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sation.  For Kundnani, the current narrative focuses almost entirely on the individual, their motiva67 -
tion and belief system, rather than encompassing the wider context which is pivotal in understand-
ing the root causes of radicalisation. Kundnani’s starting point is a study conducted in 1981 by 
Martha Crenshaw into the causes of terrorism.  Crenshaw concluded that the causes of terrorism 68
could be reduced down to a three level system; the individual (motivation and belief system), the 
group (the decision making and strategy) and finally the wider social and political context.  Since 69
9/11, Kundnani argues that a new terrorism thesis has been advanced which largely ignores levels 
two and three and instead reduces the causes of radicalisation to ideology and Islamist narrative. 
For Kundnani this is an overly simplistic way of looking at the issue, and ignores the complexity of 
the problem and the contextual nature in which radicalisation occurs. Supporting his argument, he 
points to the inaccuracy of the data used, and is particularly critical of the absence of control groups 
in some of the studies to determine whether the same ideology is held by those who hold violence 
to be abhorrent.  70
Kundnani offers an alternative position; pointing to the importance that political and social factors 
play in the radicalisation process. He points to the existing evidence, which demonstrates that reli-
gious ideology has little to do with radicalisation and instead is more to do with the social factors, 
such as kinship and group identity.  In his opinion religious ideology is used to give credence to 71
the actions of the group, creating a ‘veneer of legitimacy’ but it is not the dominant cause.  Kund72 -
nani finds the dominant factor most significantly in the political context, the actions of government 
and particularly in foreign policy decisions. Kundnani provides evidence for his opinion by pointing 
to the example  of Omar Bakri Muhammed, who justified his change in calling for violence from 
his followers on the British Government’s support of the War on Terror: 
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 ‘It would be overly reductionist to claim that this increase in the number of incidents  
 of attempt terrorist violence is entirely due to the British government’s decision to  
 participate in the Iraq war in 2003. But that decision created the political context  
 within which, for a small number of radicals, violence against fellow citizens 
 appeared legitimate.’  73
He reasons that when we look to the case of Bakri, there had been no change in ideology, rather a 
change in the political climate which enabled the group to establish legitimacy in acting violently 
towards their fellow citizens in Britain. Kundnani goes on to state that radicalisation to violence fol-
lows a historical pattern that can be seen in the actions of such groups as the IRA in 1960s.  Radi74 -
calisation is a reaction to state sponsored violence, where a violent response is legitimised by the 
violence of the government. The new terrorism thesis advocated by those who adhere to the official 
narrative ignores this historical pattern and the connection between social and political factors and 
radicalisation. Kundnani advocates that when we look to the causes of  radicalisation, the dominant 
one is the political context, arguing that ‘ religious ideology provides a vocabulary….but politics 
provides the impetus.’  Thus counter extremism policy is useless unless these factors are recog75 -
nised and positive actions are made to redress the wrongs which have been committed.  
Finally and perhaps the most promising to date, is a research project produced by the think tank 
Demos.  Their study The Edge of Violence  (Demos 2009) involved case studies from five coun76 -
tries: Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Canada and the UK. The purpose of the study was to un-
derstand why some types of radical beliefs can turn violent and into what the study terms terrorist 
acts, whilst others do not and remain non-violently radical.  The significance of the Demos study is 77
that it uses new data, gathered by the authors, rather than secondary research. In order to answer the 
questions posed the authors created in depth profiles of both terrorists and non violent radicals, 
gathered from subjects across Europe and Canada. These profiles were then compared to a control 
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sample of 70 individuals representing a cross section of members of Muslim communities in Cana-
da. Alongside this, 75 interviews were conducted with a range of local and national experts, such as 
imams, security analysts and leaders of grass roots organisations.  The study represents a signifi78 -
cant contribution to the academic field by the introduction of new and highly valuable empirical 
data.  
The primary findings of the report are that holding radical beliefs is not a necessary precursor to 
violent extremism: 
 ‘Being radical is not always the first step on the path to violence. In fact, radicalisation that 
 leads to violence can be distinguished by different indicators from those that indicate purely 
 ‘religious’, non-violent radicalisation. Assuming that radical views constitute the base of the 
 terrorist pyramid can allow for counter-radicalisation strategies against large numbers of  
 people who object entirely to al-Qaeda’s methods.’  79
The Study goes on to state that whilst radical beliefs are not necessarily positive, and in some cases 
they can contribute to the radicalisation of a percentage of individuals, they should be ‘tackled as 
social problems, not a sub-set of the al-Qaeda threat.’  80
The conclusions drawn in terms of religion and ideology were that in general non violent extremists 
have a much broader and interpretative approach to their religion, whereas violent extremists often 
had a much shallower understanding. Ideology does, however have a part to play in terms of the 
establishment of an anti-western ‘us versus them’ narrative, and this was what separated those 
committed to violence from those who were not, more than their membership to a particular inter-
pretation of Islam. However, ultimately what the study found was in  general it is often hard to sep-
arate just how far religious ideology goes in inspiring or justifying acts of violence, and it is very 
much dependant on the individual or group in question.  Many radicals and ordinary Muslims held 81
similar views in relation to the application of the Sharia or the establishment of a Caliphate but 
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would condemn the use of violence.  Demos’ findings are that radicalisation should been seen as a 82
social epidemic; it is intrinsically linked to the peer group surrounding an individual. Radicalisation 
is often found to occur in group situations where peer pressure operates as a way for an individual 
to be accepted. This is usually facilitated by an individual having grown up or having been exposed 
to a culture of violence in the past.  83
The study contends that Islamist terrorism shares similar characteristics to other extremism existing 
in society: predominantly groups of angry young men.  Radicalism becomes part and parcel of 84
growing up, with many young people from a wide cross section of society acting in ways which go 
against the established narrative, for example in anti nuclear or animal rights movements and is a 
significant part of human development. Being radical and objecting to the government position 
should not be demonised. Instead dissent should be facilitated in ways which do not drive it under-
ground and provide an environment for violent acts.  85
According to the study the most effective way of addressing radical ideas which seem dangerous to 
society at large is to approach them with open and honest debate. Having a liberal attitude to dissent 
and disagreement allows the Al Qaeda narrative which glamourises violence to be challenged with a 
counter narrative which reveals its fallacies.  Counter narrative is extremely important, but it must 86
be done in a way which facilitates debate and listens to the grievances of those who hold radical 
ideas.  
Finally radicalisation to violence is not a linear process, it is a human behaviour which is notorious-
ly difficult to predict and differs from person to person. Whilst differences exist between non vio-
lent and violent radicals, each person will respond differently when presented with the same infor-
mation. In this way radicalisation to violence is not an easy problem to solve, as historical precedent 
shows it to be a  consequence of the human condition.  However it is one that can be managed 87
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when approached in the correct way: it is society at large that must play the key role, producing a 
narrative that recognises that dissent is allowed and instead facilitates open and honest debate.  
As has been demonstrated there is significant debate surrounding the root causes of radicalisation 
and what makes some people adopt extreme and violent beliefs. The lack of consensus serves to 
explain where feelings of unease about Quilliam’s tactics and approach to counter extremism have 
developed amongst Muslim communities and academics. Quilliam appears to push to the side other 
theories of radicalisation in favour of what has been termed its ‘War on Islamism’. Recent studies 
would point away from the linear models used by Quilliam in trying to understand radicalisation 
and to construct counter extremism narratives . The evidence presented demonstrates the flaws in 
the Quilliam model and has brought into question how effective such linear approaches really are.  88
In promoting their anti-Islamist narrative they have in essence, advocated excluding some groups 
from the conversation. Although stopping short of banning their activities they would happily not 
tgive them a platform. It is argued that in doing so groups who have the potential to tackle extrem-
ism and who are currently working at grass root level would be prevented from doing so.  Its dis89 -
missive attitude to foreign policy concerns is a particularly contentious issue. The failure to recog-
nise how global events impact the radicalisation discourse is seen among some Muslims only to fuel 
the fire for those who feel powerless to act to redress the perceived wrongs committed against 
them.   In adopting such a headstrong attitude to the causes of radicalisation, the Foundation has 90
alienated those who point to other causes. Ideology does have a role to play and the separatist men-
tality pushed by some Islamist organisations can have the effect of distancing and isolating individ-
uals, making them easier targets for movements that advocate violence.  However by adopting an 
almost exclusionary approach to the problem of radicalisation, dismissive of foreign policy con-
cerns, socio-economic factors or the search for identity, it fails to recognise the wider context . As 
commentators have expressed, failing to recognise the role politics has to play in radicalisation to 
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violence not only denies the reality of the situation but it also acts in opposition to countering ex-
tremism in society.    91
The findings of the Demos study support Quilliam’s assertion of the importance of a counter narra-
tive; however the counter narrative that the Foundation advocates is one which causes concern to 
some critics. It is suggested that the Foundation conflates all forms of political Islam with an ex-
tremist ideology, and thus a proxy to violence.  The alternative narrative offered by Quilliam is a 92
depoliticised version of Islam, that fits within the confines of British society. In focusing so strongly 
on the Islamist ideology, the Foundation is seen to be taking away those spaces where people can be 
radical in an open way, where issues can challenged  and debated. Thus it could be accused of  mak-
ing political expressions of faith and dissent appear extremist. Commentators note that this is a dan-
gerous path to follow.  As Demos so succinctly put it, dissent is an inevitable part of growing up, 
the problem occurs when this dissent becomes violent. In order to prevent this, we need to allow 
young people and members of society to dissent, to hold radical views and to air these in open dis-
cussion and debate.  
The purpose of this section was not to argue for or against the narrative as expressed by Quilliam 
and the British Government. Rather it was to demonstrate the lack of consensus present in the cur-
rent understanding of the causes of radicalisation and in turn demonstrate the reasons for the feeling 
of unease and distrust felt by many towards the Foundation. Having outlined Quilliam’s approach to 
counter extremism and issues of radicalisation, it is now time to discuss the second major area of 
contention; Quilliam’s relationship with the UK Government.  
The Quilliam Foundation and The British Government
From newspaper columns, to journal articles and television debates, a recurring criticism levied at 
Quilliam is the perception of  its close relationship with the British government. At a time when 
more and more Muslim communities feel securitised by aspects of the current counter terrorism 
policy advocated by the British government, this perceived close relationship has had a profound 
effect on the confidence of others towards the think tank.  
 Tariq Ramadan, "The Politics of Fear: How Britain's Anti-extremism Strategy Has Failed | Tariq Ramadan," The 91
Guardian, September 05, 2016, , accessed September 30, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/
05/politics-of-fear-britain-anti-extremism-prevent-government-radicalisation. 
 Kundnani, "Islamism  and the Roots of Liberal Rage.92
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On researching the Quilliam Foundation and its relationship with the UK Government, one is struck 
by just how intertwined that relationship is. It is perhaps for this reason that there appears to be two 
strands of thought which have emerged and contributed to the Foundation's failure. On the one hand 
there are those who believe Quilliam to be a puppet of the Government, which is used to propagate 
a rhetoric designed to encourage citizens to accept the current UK counter extremism and terrorism 
policies. Conversely there is the opinion, which rejects this idea of Quilliam as a passive and con-
trolled entity but one that has acted subversively to influence government. In advancing its theory 
of radicalisation it has persuaded the government to adopt counter extremism policies in line with 
flawed theory, which has in turn led to the creation of harmful and draconian policies.  
Whilst it is not possible for both arguments to be factually correct, it seems to matter little. The con-
clusions arrived at are the same; Quilliam has acted, whether directly or indirectly to allow for the 
creation of counter extremism policies which its critics believe to have securitised British Muslim 
citizens and to have created suspect communities. These two strands of opinion shall be discussed 
in more detail in order to demonstrate how they have been arrived at.  
The first of these two strands of opinion is that Quilliam is a puppet of the government. This is a 
view held by many bloggers, such as Dilly Hussain of 5 pillars  and Tom Griffin of OpenDemoc93 -
racy UK  who comment on the Foundation. On a brief examination of the facts it can  be seen how 94
many have come to this conclusion. The Quilliam Foundation was brought into existence by funds 
made available by the UK Government under the first formulation of the CONTEST strategy in 
2008. Under this policy, it was hoped that extremism would be tackled by partnering with Muslim 
organisations and community groups. Quilliam was one of a number of organisations which secured 
funding from the Home Office to establish its counter extremism think tank. The funding of Quil-
liam by the Home office continued up until 2011, and in total received over £2.1 million of gov-
ernment funds between 2008 -2011.  Added to the issue of funding, Quilliam’s regular involve95 -
ment in government consultations and its advancement of what is seen, on the face of it, to be the 
government counter extremism narrative made it seem to some to be in the pocket of the UK gov-
ernment. The increasingly harsh nature of counter extremism measures has led to what many feel is 
 Dilly ‘The Quilliam Foundation crumbled in front of Home Affairs Select Committee’ December 5th 2005 accessed 93
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the securitisation of British Muslims. Despite the Muslim presence in Britain being an incredibly 
diverse one, encompassing differing strands of belief, socio economic positions and ethnicities, 
communities are apparently united in their condemnation of the draconian nature of the measures 
which have placed them under surveillance. Quilliam’s ready acceptance of these policies is seen as 
legitimising the securitisation of the British Muslim population. It’s reluctance to question Govern-
ment policy, particularly foreign policy, which is a significant area of contention for many across 
Muslim communities and outside them, has attracted criticism and suspicion as to the independence 
of the Foundation. 
For some academics Quilliam is seen as a specific creation of government as a way of influencing 
and controlling public opinion. Professor Rizwan Sabir and David Miller have contended that Quil-
liam is an example of British implementation of counter insurgency tactics as part of its counter ter-
rorism strategy.  Counter insurgency is a military strategy utilised most often in cases of guerrilla 96
warfare. In terms of the British use of the strategy the focus has been on intelligence gathering and 
communication activities.   In terms of the UK strategy the Pursue and Prevent strands of the 97
CONTEST strategy represented the coercive and communication elements of counter insurgency 
strategy.  The authors look specifically to Quilliam as an example of the Prevent strategy being 98
used as a counter insurgency tactic. An important part of counter insurgency doctrine relates to what 
is known as Key Leader Engagement (KLE).  This is a tactic used to manage the population at 99
large and in Sabir and Miller’s opinion Quilliam is an example of a KLE which is used by the gov-
ernment to win over the general public. It contends that Quilliam is a ‘classic front group’ for gov-
ernment agenda, pointing to its sources of funding, its research and the fact that it seems to tow the 
government line.  In advocating for the necessity for a strong counter narrative to be advanced in 100
place of the Islamist ideology, Quilliam can be seen to be fulfilling the communication element of 
counter extremism strategy. Quilliam is used to curb dissent by trying to convince the public to 
adopt its alternative narrative, which is in fact the government narrative in disguise.  
, Miller,  and Sabir,"Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency in the UK "war on Terror." 12-32.96
 Miller and Sabir,"Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency in the UK” 13.97
 Miller and Sabir,"Counterterrorism as Counterinsurgency in the UK” 26.98
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In addition to this, when the Foundation ceased to be funded by the Home Office in 2011, critics 
pointed to this as an example of the puppet like quality of the organisation. When controversy 
brought it into disrepute it was disregarded as no longer fulfilling its created purpose; to advance 
the government agenda in counter terrorism policy. Those who follow this strand of thought are left 
with the opinion that Quilliam’s role has been to facilitate the acceptance of government policies in 
the realm of counter extremism, by providing a Muslim voice to support policy.. Quilliam is seen as 
weak, influenced, and without its own merit, nothing more than a puppet of government. 
The second of these two strands of opinion, and the one to which the author would subscribe accu-
racy, is that it is in fact Quilliam which has influenced government. In order to demonstrate how 
this opinion has been reached it is important to trace the history of the relationship between Quil-
liam and the UK Government.  
The rise of Quilliam mirrors to some extent the decline of the UK Government’s relationship with 
the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). Formerly a close ally, who worked closely with Government 
to coordinate a public response to the London Bombings, MCB fell out of favour in 2009 over then 
Deputy Secretary General Daud Abdullah's signing of the Istanbul Declaration. The Declaration in 
question was a statement of support for Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation and was signed 
my Daud Abdullah in a personal capacity and not as representative of MCB. Hazel Blears, at the 
time Minister for Communities and Local government demanded he resign, claiming that the sign-
ing of the agreement was tantamount to support for violence against British troops. Daud Abdullah 
refused to resign from his position citing his democratic election to the post and his signing of the 
Declaration in an entirely personal capacity.  The result was to effectively sever ties between the 101
MCB and the UK Government. It would seem that this gap was readily filled by the Quilliam 
Foundation, who began to gain traction with Government and policy makers. Contrary to popular 
belief Quilliam has not always enjoyed a seamless relationship with the establishment. From its 
formation in 2008 to the end of the the Labour government, Quilliam and Whitehall had somewhat 
different approaches to counter extremism policy. The Quilliam narrative has largely stayed the 
same since its inception - extremism in all its forms, both violent and non violent should be chal-
lenged, primarily objecting to the Islamist narrative. This approach, at least at first, was not the one 
taken by the UK government. In 2006 in response to the 7/7 London bombings the Countering In-
 Amandla Thomas-Johnson ‘UK government urged to end Muslim Council of Britain ‘boycott''Monday 3 101
July 2017http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/government-needs-fix-broken-relationship-muslims-report-
says-2047835122
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ternational Terrorism: the United Kingdom’s Strategy  was introduced, setting out the UK’s 102
counter terrorism plan known as Operation Contest. This strategy had in fact been in operation 
since 2003, a response to the September 11 attacks.  Prior to the 7/7 bombings, the Prevent branch 
of the strategy had been largely ignored. With 7/7 came the realisation that radicalisation was a 
problem existing at home and focus was shifted to preventative actions. These attacks were carried 
out by British citizens who had been born and raised in British society. It raised alarm bells to many 
within government that something had gone disastrously wrong. In the wake of   the 7/7 attacks, the 
UK’s initial counter terrorism strategy focused on preventing violent extremism. This is apparent 
when one looks at the 2006 formulation of the CONTEST strategy. In this document the language 
refers solely to violent forms of extremism and radicalisation  Claire Arènes argues that the reason-
ing behind this can be found in the original ‘national security agenda under which Prevent was 
formed: the priority of any counterterrorism plan is to reduce the number of violent attacks against 
the country’s safety.’  The decision to avoid including non-violent extremism in the initial strate103 -
gy, had the practical effect of giving government institutions the flexibility to partner with organisa-
tions whose ideology, whilst extreme, was non violent in nature and who could provide valuable 
information and knowledge in the fight against terrorism . From the period of 2002 to 2006, the 
Muslims Contact Unit (MCU), part of the London Metropolitan Police Force was active in engag-
ing with non-violent extremists.  Robert Lambert, now professor at The University of St Andrews, 104
headed up this unit and was involved in a number of operations whose focus was to counter the 
threat of violent extremism in London. The most notable success was the removal of the now jailed 
hate preacher Abu Hamza from the Finsbury Mosque.  The rationale behind this approach was 105
that non violent extremists could provide valuable information and knowledge to counter the threat 
of violent attacks on British soil.  This was, however, a position completely at odds with the Quil-
liam doctrine on counter extremism and the approach which has now dominated government policy. 
 HM Government Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy July 2006. Ac102 -
cessed October 2 2017http://www.iwar.org.uk/homesec/resources/uk-threat-level/uk-counterterrorism-strate-
gy.pdf
Claire, Arènes "Prevention of Terrorism in Britain: Fighting Violent or Non-violent Extremism? The Influ103 -
ence of the Quilliam Foundation." The Politics of Ethnic Diversity in the British Isles, ed. Romain Garbaye 
and Pauline Schnapper (London; Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004) 2014, 58-73. doi:
10.1057/9781137351548_4. 63
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Quilliam, in its launch paper, was critical of what it saw as partnerships which legitimised Islamist 
ideology.  It pushed an agenda which sought to tackle all forms of extremism. 106
This criticism of the Government would form a strong united voice amongst a number of neocon-
servative organisations and think tanks. In addition to Quilliam’s condemnation of government pol-
icy, The Policy Exchange and the Centre for Social Cohesion were vocal in what they saw as the 
platforming of Islamist narrative.  In 2009 The Policy Exchange released their analysis of Pre107 -
venting Violent Extremism (PVE) entitled Choosing Our Friends Wisely: Criteria for Engagement 
with Muslim Groups (Policy Exchange 2009). In this analysis they were highly critical of the gov-
ernment’s PVE initiative. Stating that whilst it was made with the best of intentions, it had failed to 
work and had in some cases resulted in public funds being utilised by extremist organisations to ad-
vance an anti western Islamist narrative, which was directly  at odds with modern British values.  108
The result of this criticism, undoubtedly heightened by global developments in the War on Terror, 
was for the Government to modify its counter extremism policy to explicitly include non-violent 
extremism. In 2011 the UK government published a revision of the CONTEST strategy. It marked a 
significant change in governmental tactics in dealing with counter terrorism. As can be seen from 
the document, the findings of Quilliam and other organisations, have lead to a rethinking of the pol-
icy:‘ We believe that Prevent work to date has not clearly recognised the way in which some terror-
ist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused and circulated by appar-
ently non-violent organisations, very often operating within the law.’ Whilst assuring that human 109
rights legislation was not going to be changed in regards to the legality of the existence of non-vio-
lentextreme organisations, it made explicit mention of the need to challenge ‘extremist ideas that 
are conducive to terrorism and also part of a terrorist narrative,’ .  In addition it states ‘…nor will 110
we fund or work with extremist groups’. Turning to the Prevent publication, the strategy is to chal-
 Quilliam, "Pulling Together to Defeat Terror - Quilliam Launch Paper," Quilliam, April 2009, , accessed September 106
29, 2016, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/pulling-together-to-defeat-ter-
ror.pdf 
 Arènes “Prevention of Terrorism in Britain: Fighting Violent or Non-violent Extremism? The Influence of 107
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lenge both violent and non-violent extremist behaviour. In addition there is clear indication of the 
adoption of the radicalisation narrative as espoused by the Quilliam Foundation. There is reference 
to Salafist theological traditions, and theMuslim Brotherhood, as being resources from which vio-
lent radicals draw their thinking.   111
Since 2011, Quilliam has ceased to be funded by the Home Office, a move which was originally 
agreed upon on the creation of the organisation - funding on a decreasing scale until alternative 
sources could be secured , a fact skirted around by those who see this as the government disasso112 -
ciating itself from the Foundation.  
Whilst the two strands of opinion on Quilliam’s relationship to government cannot both be factually 
correct, it seems irrelevant to the conclusions drawn. In both cases the perception remains that Quil-
liam is complicit in the establishment of the current counter extremism policy as enshrined in 
statute by the UK Government. These policies, in particular the PREVENT strategy, have been met 
with intense criticism from both within and without the UK’s Muslim communities . Quilliam is 113
seen as being complicit in the securitisation of British Muslims, of creating a climate of fear and 
indirectly facilitating the rise of islamophobia in Britain. 
The Problem of Prevent
As has been discussed the UK counter extremism strategy has undergone significant change since 
its 2007 beginnings. The current strategy as we know it was published back in the 2011, and whilst 
having undergone revision remains largely the same. Known as CONTEST, the UK counter extrem-
ism policy is made of four parts, known as the three Ps - Protect, Prepare, Pursue, Prevent. The 
main focus of the policy over the last few years has been the Pursue and Prevent elements. The 
 HM Government. "Prevent Strategy 2011." June 2011. Accessed September 28, 2016. https://www.gov.uk/govern111 -
ment/publications/prevent-strategy-2011.
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most contested element of the strategy and the one to which we shall turn our attention  is the Pre-
vent element.  
  
The aim of the Prevent strategy, as defined by the legislation is to ‘reduce the threat to the UK from 
terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorist or supporting terrorism’.  In essence it is a pre114 -
emptive strategy consisting of three main objectives; ‘to respond to the ideology challenge of terror-
ism, to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and to work with sectors/institutions where 
there is a risk of radicalisation’.  Under section 26(1) of the Counter Terrorism Act 2015, a duty is 115
placed upon public institutions, including local authorities, education institutions and the NHS, to 
‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ . In practice this 116
means that institutions are under an obligation to report to the relevant authority those persons 
whom they suspect may be at risk of radicalisation or extremism. Such a duty then raises the ques-
tion of what is meant by 'extremism'. As has been noted, UK legislation defines extremism as be-
haviour which goes against British values, these values being freedom of expression, belief toler-
ance and mutual respect. 
In order to determine what is or is not extremist behaviour a benchmark needs to be set. In the con-
text of UK legislation that benchmark is secular humanism.  However, undoubtedly there are those 
in secular society and among religious communities who are going to have different views on what 
is extreme. A conservative Christian is going to have very different opinions on issues such as same 
sex marriage and concepts of gender, than mainstream secular society. Whilst these views may 
seem extreme  or outmoded in the eyes of some elements of the  media and secular society they will 
not  appear so to that person or the religious community to which they belong. This problem of 
freedom of belief in the context of religious faith has been seen recently in the UK courts in the ex-
ample of the Northern Irish Baking firm, Ashers, who refused to make a cake with the slogan, ‘We 
Support Gay Rights’, as they stated it went against their religious beliefs.  For many, such a belief 117
 Home Office, Revised Prevent Duty for England and Wales, 2015, accessed April 17, 2016 https://www.gov.uk/gov114 -
ernment/publications/prevent-duty-guidance ;  
Home Office, Revised Prevent Duty for Scotland, 2015, accessed April 17, 2016 https://www.gov.uk/government/publi-
cations/prevent-duty-guidance
 Home Office Prevent Duty  s.6115
The Counter Terrorism  and Security Act 2015 section 26(1) available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/116
ukpga/2015/6/section/26/enacted 
 BBC News 'Gay cake' appeal: Christian bakers Ashers lose appeal' October 24th 2016 http://www.bbc.117 -
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would be seen as ‘extreme’ and contrary to the British values mentioned but to the couple who held 
these views, they were not extreme but instead were their religious beliefs based on Biblical teach-
ings. As such, the question is raised as to where religion is accommodated  when the benchmark 
being used is secular humanism and in what form is religion deemed to be acceptable. The prob-
lematic nature of trying to define extremism reveals the tension that exists when freedom of belief 
is applied to religious faith. It is easy to see how a  particular religious belief could be held to be 
extreme when the benchmark is secular humanism. It is perhaps then not surprising to hear that the 
Prevent strategy has come under intense criticism from both the Muslim and non Muslim communi-
ties.  For many it is Orwellian in nature, perhaps reminiscent of the film Minority Report where 118
the mere thought of committing a crime is punished.   Primarily its critics see it as a securitisation 119
of the British Muslim community, a spying exercise which is more of a hindrance to the battle 
against radicalisation than a effective solution to the problem.   120
A significant part of the Prevent strategy is early intervention to combat the risk of radicalisation of 
vulnerable individuals and this is done through what is known as the Channel Programme. Channel 
is a multi agency process which seeks to identify those vulnerable to radicalisation and provide 
them with the support and guidance to help them make better informed decisions. Under the Chan-
nel guidance, vulnerability to radicalisation is assessed by reference to three factors: engagement 
with a group, cause of ideology, intent to cause harm and capability to cause harm. Whilst ‘intent 
and capability to cause harm’ is fairly self explanatory in their relation to radicalisation, it is the en-
gagement with a group, cause or ideology, that has been of the most concern to those critical of the 
strategy, perhaps due to the width of its reach. Under the Channel guidance, engagement can be dis-
cerned from such factors as a change in dress, the possession of material or symbols associated with 
extremism, a change of friendship group and interaction with others that suggest an identification 
 Heath-Kelly ‘Counter Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the Radicalisation Discourse and the UK PRE118 -
VENT Strategy. ’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15,  no. 3 (2013) 394-415; Mohammed 
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ton Post, Aug 25, 2014, accessed April 17, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mohammed-ansar/how-britain-lost-
war-on-muslim-radicalisation_b_5702477.html.; Homa Khaleeli ‘ You worry they could take your kids: Is the Prevent 
strategy demonising Muslim School Children?’ Guardian Online, Sept 23, 2015 accessed April 17, 2016 http://
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with an ideology or cause.  The vagueness of the guidance and its recognition that there is no one 121
identifier of radicalisation, is what critics point to as the weakness of the policy. Critics of the policy 
suggest it means that discussion of the Islamic faith is polarised between the extremist forms and 
the depoliticised and passive forms.  A binary is created, when this in practice does not exist.   122
If we are to take one example of the Prevent duty, it is easy to unravel the unease with which the 
strategy is greeted. As has been stated, Prevent places a duty on all public sector employees, how-
ever the most controversial  is the duty of Prevent in schools. The Prevent duty was met with strong 
opposition, with The National Union of Teachers calling for the duty to be scrapped.   Under the 123
Prevent duty teachers have a legal obligation to report any child they believe is at risk of radicalisa-
tion. But what makes a child at risk of radicalisation and what is merely a children acting rebel-
liously during their formative years? For teachers who have no specialist knowledge of religion or 
ethnic minorities this is a question which poses real difficulties and it is easy to see how mistakes 
can be made.  In order to aid teachers in their duty, the Department of Children, Schools and Fami-
lies has issued guidance in the form Learning to be Safe Together: A Toolkit to Help Schools Con-
tribute to the Prevention of Violent Extremism (2008).  Interestingly this publication explicitly 124
refers to the Quilliam Foundation and it appears to have adopted the Foundation’s recommendations 
in identifying indicators of extremism. There is very little in the way of guidance as to what should 
point to a child at risk of radicalisation, and as such it is again under the Prevent factors outlined 
above that guidance must be taken. The feeling from teachers themselves is that the result of the 
guidance and subsequent training is that Muslim students are disproportionally targeted under the 
strategy.   Concern has also been expressed by parents in that they are at risk of losing their chil125 -
dren under the government initiative for holding conservative views which may be deemed ‘ex-
treme’ or adopting religious dress or having an interest in politics.  126
 HM Government “Channel Guidance” 121
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In addition to this fear there have been alarming cases of the reporting of students whose behaviour 
has nothing to do with radicalisation. A recent example is a student at a school in Luton who was 
reported under the Prevent strategy for organising fundraising for Palestine at school. His interest in 
Palestine was deemed to amount to an indicator of a risk of radicalisation.  This is not an isolated 127
event and there have been a number of referrals to Channel for issues relating to political interests. 
This focus on politics as an indicator of radicalisation is a significant issue of contention as it is 
seen as depoliticising British Muslims. Partisan support for particular world views, for example, 
support for recognition of the state of Palestine, are being used as specific indicators of radicalisa-
tion. In this way the acceptability of religion is seen to be dependent on its ability to exist within a 
vacuum, unaffected by geopolitical events. Quilliam’s complicity in the creation of current counter 
extremism strategies has been a significant factor in its rejection by wide sections of the Muslim 
community and the Quilliam response to the Prevent strategy has only served to further this opin-
ion. On 7th June 2011, the Foundation officially responded to the review of the Prevent strategy by 
the UK Government. The Foundation welcomed the changes which had been made, in particular the 
Government’s new commitment to challenging non-violent and violent extremism.  Quilliam 128
commended the Government on recognising the importance that ideology plays in the process of 
radicalisation, and the taking away of funding from Islamist organisations which are perceived as 
‘extreme’. For many members of the Muslim community who find the policy to be islamophobic 
and to have securitised their existence, this has only sought to demonstrate Quilliam’s disconnect 
from the realities of life at grass roots level and an ideological secular response to religious faith.   
From the analysis undertaken it is clear that Quilliam’s close relationship with government has been 
a significant factor in its rejection, in particular from the Muslim communities it looks to engage. 
For some, Quilliam, is merely the puppet of government, a way for counter extremism policies to be 
presented as acceptable because they are advanced by those who are Muslims. More critically, some 
view the Foundation as acting subversively to influence government policy in order to address what 
is sees as the root cause of extremism, Islamism. The result of both of these views has been the 
same; Quilliam is perceived as being complicit in the establishment of draconian and repressive 
counter extremism policies that unfairly target Muslim communities. The Prevent policy and the 
 The Independent. "Anti-terror Police Question Schoolboy for Wearing Pro-Palestine Badge." The Independent. Feb127 -
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duty placed on public sector employees, particularly teachers and university lecturers, has created 
an air of suspicion.     
The policy has created suspect communities and has promoted a culture of fear and distrust. More-
over Quilliam’s vocal approval of the Policy has only served to highlight what critics see as  out of 
touch attitudes to the realities of life under Prevent. 
A Serious of Unfortunate Incidents  
As has been discussed, there appears to exist some intrinsic ideological differences between Quil-
liam, its critics and Muslim communities at large, which have formed the basis for feelings varying 
from unease to an intense dislike in regards to the Foundation. There have also, however, been a 
series of  ‘unfortunate incidents’ which have caught the attention of the media and brought Quilliam 
into the limelight for all the wrong reasons. It is perhaps these incidents which have made more of 
an impact on its credibility with the ordinary public than anything else. Reference to these incidents 
is necessary to fully understand what went wrong for Quilliam. Three examples  highlight the issue 
of negative public perception of Quilliam . 
(1) The ‘Terror List’ 
On 4th of August 2010 The Guardian Newspaper reported on an apparent ‘terror list’ which formed 
part of a briefing compiled by Quilliam which was sent to the director general of the Office for Se-
curity and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) a directorate of the Home Office.  The list in question ap129 -
pears as an appendices to a strategic briefing compiled by Quilliam entitled ‘Preventing Terrorism: 
Where next for Britain?’   Appendix A of this document lays out a list of entities which Quilliam 130
alleged were sympathetic to Islamism.Listed amongst these were The Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB), the Islam Channel and Birmingham Central Mosque. It advised the Government to be wary 
of engagement with the groups listed, as association would empower aspects of Islamist ideology 
 Vikram Dodd, "List Sent to Terror Chief Aligns Peaceful Muslim Groups with Terrorist Ideology," The Guardian, 129
August 04, 2010, , accessed September 28, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/aug/04/quilliam-foundation-
list-alleged-extremism .
 Quilliam Foundation, "Preventing Terrorism - Where Next for Britain" June 2010, , accessed September 28, 2016, 130
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which are the root cause of terrorism.  The document goes on to list groups who have Wahhabi 131
influences, such as the Strategy to Reach, Empower, and Educate Teenagers (STREET), an organi-
sation run largely by members of a Muslim community in  London, which works with at-risk youth 
to divert them from involvement in antisocial behaviour, the London Central mosque and the World 
Association of Muslim Youth. Whilst recognising that some of these groups may have the ability to 
‘reach a degree of reconciliation between conservative social values and a liberal secular space’, it 
warns that ultimately  theWahhabi ideology behind these groups threatens integration and national 
cohesion in Britain.  While not directly linking any of these organisations to any extremist groups 132
it is careful to point out that the same conservative attitudes are an ‘essential part of the Salafist-Ji-
had ideology which lies behind al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups’.  Finally the briefing lists 133
groups associated with traditional South Asian and Sufi approaches to Islam which it cites as organ-
isations that could bring positive results when worked with.  As has been previously mentioned 134
the Foundation seems keen to encourage government to work with Sufi groups as opposed to other 
faith positions. The document however fails to demonstrate how Muslims from other faith tradi-
tions, are to be represented. Such an omission seems to play into the hands of those who see the 
Foundation as out of touch with the reality of being Muslim in Britain today, particularly the ethnic 
and cultural diversity that is present in British Muslim society. While the briefing does not explicitly 
direct the government against working with the organisations listed, it all but says that doing so 
would be counter productive to preventing extremism. The list is extensive   representing a wide 
array of Muslim communities across Britain. The response to the document was as expected strong-
ly critical. Condemnation of the Foundation’s actions came from both the community and political 
sphere. The Labour MP Keith Vaz stated that the actions of the Foundation were of concern as it 
was ‘very dangerous to be drawing up lists of this kind’ . Robert Lambert, the former head of the 135
Muslim Contact Unit, stated that it ‘demonises a whole range of groups that in my experience have 
made valuable contributions to counter-terrorism.’  A number of groups mentioned in the briefing 136
came out to condemn Quilliam for its actions. Fatima Khan of the Muslim Safety Unit stated that it 
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showed Quilliam’s desperation to secure government funding , whilst Inayat Bunglawala, chair of 137
Muslims4Uk, described the list as a ‘Stasi Manual’ and called it appalling and self serving.  Quil138 -
liam responded to the allegations, denying the existence of any ‘terror list’, arguing it was the exact 
opposite,  yet these were groups which should remain legal but challenged in civic debate.   139
In whatever way the briefing was supposed to be received, it is difficult not to interpret it as a list of 
organisations which Quilliam feels that  the government should avoid .The effect of this was to call 
for a number of organisations which represent large sections of the Muslim population in Britain to 
be frozen out of the conversation in regard to counter extremism. It is therefore apparent that Quil-
liam has by virtue of its action managed to alienate a wide array of actors, many of whom operate at 
grass roots levels in the communities the Government is trying to bring on board. It is seen by many 
as limiting the voice of Muslims by advocating for a specific de-politicised version of Islam  and 140
has left many disappointed concerning the Government's motives and vision for Muslim communi-
ties in Britain. 
(2) Maajid Nawaz and the Twitter Storm 
Since the formation of Quilliam in 2008, it has been Maajid Nawaz who has emerged as the organi-
sation’s most prominent and recognised figure. He is a regular on mainstream television in both the 
UK and US, and is often invited to discuss issues of Islamic extremism in the wake of atrocities 
such as the Paris attack.  In addition he has a large twitter following, is a regular contributor to 141
newspaper columns and radio shows, and even ran for public office as a Liberal Democrat candi-
date. In Quilliam publications and press releases Nawaz is a regular contributor, whether providing 
a foreword to a report or an opinion piece on the media treatment. Nawaz, a self described former 
radical, has even published an autobiography entitled Radical (Nawaz 2012) documenting his own 
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path into and exit from the Islamist organisation Hizb ut- Tahrir. A cursory reading of Radical re-
veals a clear connection between Quilliam’s approach to countering extremism and the personal ex-
perience of one its  founders.  Nawaz’s actions and opinion have become intrinsically linked with 142
the Foundation.  
When Nawaz retweeted a picture of a t-shirt which had part of a controversial comic strip featuring 
Jesus and the Prophet Muhammad printed on it, the reaction was anything but beneficial for Nawaz 
and Quilliam. The incident itself followed Nawaz’s appearance on the BBC debate show The Big 
Question, during which two students were pictured wearing t-shirts with an image of Jesus saying 
‘Hi Mo’ to a stick figure, intended to represent Muhammad. This image was taken from a larger 
comic strip which depicted Jesus and the Prophet engaging in sexual acts, watching pornography 
and using colourful language. After appearing on the BBC show Nawaz tweeted a picture of the T-
shirt in question with the caption ‘This is not offensive and I'm sure God is greater than to feel 
threatened by it.’    143
Nawaz’s tweet was met unsurprisingly with wide spread criticism. The tweet in question raises in-
teresting questions in relation to the wider issues of freedom of speech, freedom of expression in the 
context of criticisms of religion. This issue of blasphemy was originally sparked by the publication 
of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses in 1988 and more recently in 2005 by the Danish newspa-
per Jyllands-Posten  who published 12 cartoon depictions of Muhammad .The issue has gained 144
further notoriety with the terrorist attack  on the offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris and remains of 145
great sensitivity, demonstrated most recently by the case of the Jordanian writer Nahed Hattar who 
was shot dead outside a court in Amman where he was facing charges over a cartoon of the 
Muhammad.  The issue of freedom of speech and its relationship to religion, specifically in the 146
context of satirical representation of religious figures, would be a thesis in itself and is out with the 
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scope of this work, but what is undeniable, however, is the controversy which surrounds the issue; it 
evokes strong emotions and often combative responses which have resulted in violence from both 
far right and Islamic extremists. Criticism came from across the board in response to Nawaaz’s 147
actions; The Liberal Democratic peer Lord Tony Greaves, deemed the behaviour ‘absolutely not 
acceptable’ and required a ‘fulsome apology’. In addition he stated that a liberal attitude did not 148
give someone the right to offend another, but was rather about ‘tolerating the religious and ethical 
views of others and making a serious effort not to insult people’.  In addition a letter signed by 149
sixty Muslim organisations and individuals was sent to Nick Clegg intimating concern. A petition 
for Nawaz's removal as a Liberal Democrat Prospective Parliamentary Candidate for Hampstead 
and Kilburn garnered 21,000 signatures. Nawaaz received threats to his life as a result of his ac-
tions.  150
Whilst the issue was never expressed as the direct opinion of the Quilliam Foundation, Nawaz’s vis-
ibility as almost the public representative meant the organisation was drawn into the controversy.  151
Many saw his action as a poorly chosen attempt to gain attention and publicity for himself and his 
organisation.  For many it was an example of how out of touch the organisation and its leaders 152
were with mainstream Muslim populations. It also played to those who saw Quilliam as taking 
funding away from torganisations present at grass roots level and who were in touch with the con-
cerns and issues at the heart of Muslim communities within Britain.  
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(3) Quilliam and the English Defence League 
The final incident which needs mentioning is Quilliam’s controversial and albeit brief relationship 
with the far right. On 8th October 2013, Quilliam announced that it had been working with Tommy 
Robinson the founder and leader of the English Defence League (EDL), a group known for its anti-
Islamic views, and his deputy Kevin Carroll, in order to facilitate their departure from the organisa-
tion.  Both Robinson and Carroll, the Foundation stated, had realised the error of their ways; 153
recognising the danger of far-right extremism they hoped to follow a new path, away from the EDL 
and similar organisations.  This announcement was followed shortly afterwards by a press confer154 -
ence organised by Quilliam, during which Robinson and Carroll officially announced their resigna-
tion from the EDL and ‘acknowledged the dangers of far-right extremism and the ongoing need to 
counter Islamist ideology not with violence but with better, democratic ideas.’   155
This unlikely partnership between Robinson, Carroll and Quilliam was met with scepticism with 
many seeing it as nothing more than a PR stunt.  It wasn’t long before this scepticism became jus156 -
tified. In 2015, after Mr Robinson alleged that he had been paid by Quilliam to leave the EDL, the 
Foundation admitted that money had changed hands with Robinson during his departure from the 
EDL. It was quick to assert that it had not paid to neutralise Robinson, rather it had ‘remunerated 
[him], as an external actor, after invoicing us for costs associated with outreach’. Perhaps adding 157
more salt to the wound Robinson has gone on to work with Patriotic Europeans Against the Islami-
sation of the Occident (Pegida), addressing a rally in the Netherlands during which he declared his 
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pride at having established the EDL.    It would seem that very little has changed for Robinson 158
and the affair has been nothing short of a disaster for Quilliam. It has brought Quilliam’s tactics on 
tackling extremism and their effectiveness into question; the approach it advocated for drawing 
someone away from extremism has in this case very publicly and rather embarrassingly failed.   
Chapter III  
What next for Counter Extremism  
In light of the discussion outlined above, it is apparent that Quilliam has failed to gain support of 
both those within and without  Britain’s Muslim communities. Before concluding, it therefore 
seems appropriate to ask the question: where does the nation go from here in regard to counter ex-
tremism policy? The analysis of Quillam and the difficulties it has faced, provide a number of sug-
gestions for how better to approach the issue of extremism.  
The analysis of the different theories with regard to radicalisation discourse demonstrates the need 
for better and more informed research into the area. A common theme in the current literature is the 
lack of accurate data available in coming to evidence based conclusions on the causes of radicalisa-
tion. Studies into extremism and radicalisation are notoriously difficult, as it deals with the most 
unpredictable of subjects, human beings, however the Demos study has demonstrated that focus and 
well evidenced research can be achieved, if the time and effort is invested.  
This analysis has demonstrated the need to adopt an open minded approach to the causes of radical-
isation. It is suggested that the puzzle metaphor is a good example of how better to conceptualise it, 
as it takes into account the non-linear nature of the issue. In recognising the multi faceted nature of 
radicalisation, all aspects of the problem need to be addressed. Dismissing issues such as foreign 
policy concerns and grievance is only counter productive to the overall goal. It is important to 
recognise how important political and social factors have on an individual’s journey; racism, islam-
Cahal Milmo, "‘EDL Founder Tommy Robinson Addresses Pegida Anti-Islam Rally in Holland’," The Independent, 158
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ophobia and poverty all have a part to play. Making positive steps to address these issues will only 
work to improve the situation. 
The discussion would also suggest that there needs to be a clear separation from government institu-
tions and the bodies who try to tackle extremism. For many who already hold grievances towards 
the government, a close association with government reduces the legitimacy of the association in 
the eyes of many individuals. Most of all a balance needs to be struck between intervention when 
people are at risk of radicalisation and a policy which results in effectively securitising the commu-
nity. Intervention is of course necessary and channels need to exist for those who work in areas 
where vulnerability to radicalisation exist. However, there needs to be a proper separation of what is 
deemed extreme and dangerous and what is not. Greater recognition of the different viewpoints re-
ligious communities and secular society will have on what is deemed extreme is needed so as to 
better inform decision making and reporting. What is extreme to secular society is not necessarily 
going to be seen as extreme in the eyes of a religious community. This is perhaps the greatest hurdle 
which needs to be overcome, how to find a balance between these two, at times, opposing views. 
Currently an air of suspicion exists which is leading to dangerous outcomes, and this must be 
avoided at all costs. A policing duty placed on those outside the police force does not seem con-
ducive to counter extremism work. It has only created suspect communities and increased what is 
felt by many to be the securitisation of their communities. Instead counter extremism work should 
focus on workable counter narratives, addressed at grass roots level by organisations who are better 
in touch with the factors that lead to radicalisation. These alternative narratives should not limit the 
political ambitions of young people but instead allow for open and honest discussion.  
In addition it needs to be recognised that excluding organisations from the discussion because they 
possess an ideology which is deemed radical, even though non-violent, is not the best solution.  
In many cases radical organisations can be best placed to act as a safety valve for those who have 
such views, by allowing them to express themselves but in an environment which condemns vio-
lence. Most importantly of all what is pivotal is the support and backing of the community at large, 
without this any effort is doomed to fail. As has been demonstrated by past efforts such as the Mus-
lim Contact Unit, some of the most valuable information in countering extremism comes from the 
community. This information will only be forth coming when the community is confident in the 
agencies that counter radicalisation. 
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Finally, it is important to be mindful of the sensitivities that surround the issues of religion  particu-
larly when it involves criticism . Whilst limiting freedom of speech is not advocated, it is necessary 
to exercise sensitivity when dealing with issues of a controversial nature. The infamous Rushdie 
Affair illustrates perhaps most effectively the sensitivity surrounding freedom of expression in rela-
tion to criticism of religion. This incident related to the publication of his work The Satanic Verses, 
a fictional work inspired by the life of Muhammad. The work caused outrage across the world due 
to its depiction of  Islam as ‘a deceitful, ignorant, and sexually deviant religion.’  At the height of 159
the tension caused by the publication, Ayatollah Khomeini the then Supreme Leader of Iran, issued 
a Fatwa calling for Rushdie and his publishers to be killed.   
Central to the controversy was the issue of freedom of expression and whether there should be any 
limits , particularly when the exercise of this freedom has the effect of vilifying a minority faith 
group. Rushdie’s supporters were emphatic in their belief that there should be no limitation to 160
freedom of expression, viewing it as the cornerstone of democracy. In their opinion free and open 
exchange of ideas and opinion is beneficial to all sector of society. However, as critics point out 
these exchanges of opinion were not between groups on an equal footing. Rushdie occupied a privi-
leged position, whilst many of his critics in Britain, members of Muslim communities occupied po-
sitions at the bottom of the socio economic ladder. Whilst calls to violence are never to be legit-
imised many Muslim communities were calling simply for a balance to be made between freedom 
of expression and the recognition of religiously sensitive issues and deliberately provocative acts. 
For many the Rushdie affair demonstrated the fallacy that freedom of expression benefits all in 
western society: ‘What we still must learn from the Rushdie Affair is that freedom of expression, 
while in theory an extraordinary concept, rarely functions in practice in a way that is truly and 
equally inclusive of the diversity of voices and perspectives in Western societies.’ For Tariq 161
Modood, Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the University of Bristol, in cases 
such as the Rushdie affair and the case of the Danish cartoons it is not the works themselves that are 
the main issue, instead they are the triggers which bring to the forefront the real issues which exist - 
problems of racism, securitisation and marginalisation which are all only reinforced by the use of 
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humiliating and insensitive images.  For Modood, if what we are trying to achieve in western so162 -
ciety is a integrated multicultural society, then restraint must be exercised in using freedom of ex-
pression. In his opinion this is not to say that such expression should be banned, this would be un-
democratic, rather he states that responsibility must be placed on individuals to recognise what is 
‘lawful but not acceptable’.  Debate is an important aspect of the counter narrative, but it must be 163
done in a way which engages the participant not pushes them away.  In approaching counter ex-
tremism strategy it must be recognised that the values we are seeking to protect for example toler-
ance, respect. human rights and freedoms, cannot be compromised in pursuing counter extremism 
policies, as to do so would be at risk of undermining the very things we are seeking to protect. 
 Tariq Modood ‘The liberal dilemma: integration or vilification?’ International Migration Jan 2006 https://www.re162 -
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tion_Reprinted_from_Independent_Online_Magazine_February_2006/links/5530d4d30cf20ea0a06f9884/The-liberal-
dilemma-Integration-or-vilification-Reprinted-from-Independent-Online-Magazine-February-2006.pdf  1 
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Concluding Remarks 
At the outset of this thesis a question was posed: What went wrong for Quilliam? The short answer 
to the question is that the Foundation failed to gain credibility with the very communities it sought 
to work with. Whilst it did for a time hold favour with policy makers, it never gained the support of 
Muslim communities in Britain. It would also seem that its once close relationship with the Gov-
ernment has waned, and that politicians and policymakers have sought to distance themselves from 
the controversy surrounding the organisation.  This analysis has demonstrated how the organisa164 -
tion’s commitment to a very specific and determined vision of what causes radicalisation has been 
instrumental in its failure.  Its opinion that Islamist ideology lies at the heart of radicalisation is yet 
to be proven. There are many voices in opposition to this view and as has been demonstrated. a 
number of research studies have been undertaken which question the legitimacy of this theory. It 
would seem that to conceive of radicalisation as a linear process may be to misunderstand the phe-
nomenon entirely. What can be said for certain is that until further research is conducted, adopting 
such a specific view risks hindering the battle against violent extremism. Leading on from this, it 
has been demonstrated how Quilliam’s relationship with the UK Government has further eroded its 
legitimacy. For some it is merely a puppet of government, for others a subversive organisation 
whose tentacles have reached into the very heart of government policy making. What can be said 
for certain is that this relationship with government has made Quilliam complicit in the creation of a 
counter extremism policy which is despised by many. The Prevent strategy has left communities 
feeling securitised and fearful. It has been linked to a rise in islamophobia and has created a general 
feeling of mistrust and alienation. The ambiguity surrounding what is meant by extremist behaviour 
only serves to further marginalise and has led to the misreporting of individuals who had no in-
volvement in extremism. The issue serves to highlight the subjective nature of what is extreme; 
secular and religious society are always going to have very different opinions on this. Finally, Quil-
liam’s insensitive actions have for many been the final nail in the coffin. Its list of organisations 
which it deemed to be sympathetic to Islamist ideology was described as something out of a Stasi 
Manual and sought to demonise a number of prominent Muslim organisations. The Foundation’s 
relationship with far right extremists and its failure to deliver on its promise of de-radicalisation has 
been called into question by many, challenging the motives and abilities of the Foundation. Finally 
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the actions of its members have failed to uphold the very values of tolerance that it seeks to protect. 
The tweeting of satirical religious cartoons was for many a direct provocation, intended to attract 
attention for an organisation who no longer enjoyed the limelight it once did.  
In understanding what went wrong for Quilliam, it is hoped that lessons can be learned in order to 
approach the issue of countering extremism in a more fruitful way. The field of counter extremism 
is in desperate need of further empirical research to truly understand what makes someone adopt  
extremist beliefs which lead to violence. Arguably counter narrative is key to combatting extrem-
ism, but it cannot be a narrative that limits the political ambitions or diminishes legitimately held 
grievances: such narratives do not work. Instead policy needs to focus on engaging all members of 
the community, regardless of belief in order to establish workable solutions to the issue of extrem-
ism. In conclusion Quilliam has been a victim of its own actions and ideology and whilst it contin-
ues to operate, it does so against the back drop of having united people from across the religious, 
political and social spectrum, in their condemnation of the Foundation.   
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